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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was originallY commenced by the State
of Utah acting by and through its Road Commission to
condemn the fee title of certain lands for Interstate
Highway purposes. The Appellants and the Respondents both claim to be the owners of such lands and this
proceeding will determine such ownership.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
Following a pretrial hearing before the District
Court on November 17, 19G4, and a Stipulation there
entered into between the present Appellants and the
Respondents, the District Court on the 29th day of Di'cember, 1964, entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment in favor of the Respondents, A. P,
Neilson and Lillie l\f. Neilson, his wife. From these Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, the Appellants, Utab
Power & Light Company and Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company, appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek a reversal of judgment of the
District Court and a judgment in their favor as a matter
of law to the effect that they are the owners of the
property involved herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by the State of Utah
acting by and through its State Road Commission by the
filing of a complaint and by the service of smmnons on
or about April 4, 1963. (Tr. 1) The action sought to
condemn the fee title to approximately 20 separate tract8
of land for Interstate Highway 80 and particularly the
west approach of said highway from the Salt Lake City
Airport to Interstate Highway 15. (Tr. 17) Both the
Appellants and the Respondents were the owners of
several tracts and the controversy between themselve~

and the Road Commission has been resolved with the
L'\reption of the one tract involved in this proceeding.
This tract is designated in the complaint as Parcel No.
02-3 :-±7D :'11 and is legally described as all of Lots 19 and
20, Block 9, Irving Park Addition, Salt Lake City Survey.
As to this tract of land, both the Appellants and thr.
Respondents agreed that the appraised value as made
and offered by the Road Commission was fair and such
amount is reflected in the judgment. (Tr. 26 and 29)
However, these parties have not agreed upon the owner
ship of the tract of land condemned.
rrhe stipulation entered into between these parties
on November 17, 1964, (Tr. 34) and the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the District
Court on December 29, 1964, (Tr. 39 and 43) show the
evidentiary facts to be the following. Since the issuance
of the patent to these lands, taxes for three different
~'ears remained unpaid and for each of these years an
Auditor's Tax Deed subsequently issued to Salt Lake
County. Each of these tax deeds was issued without the
attachment of the required affidavit of the County Auditor to the tax rolls. On March 12, 1958, Salt Lake County
deeded the property to the Respondents who thereafter
paid to the Salt Lake County Treasurer the general
taxes levied against said property.
1.'he Respondents have never had actual possession
of the property and have done nothing with respect to
said property that could be said in any way to evidence
any claim of ownership thereto by way of fences, cultiration or improvements of any kind. (Tr. 39)
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The Appellants contend that they are the owners of
the property and base this contention of ownership upon
conveyances from the admitted owner Jacob I All
'
·
enbach, through his wido-\v, Harriet Allenbach. The record
is wholly silent as to whether Jacob I. Allenbach di Pd
otherwise than intestate or left any heirs other than his
wife, Harriet. (Tr. 39)
The Appellants became the owners of the property
on January 10, 1955 and commencing with the year 195G
and for each year to and including 1963 Appellants paid
to Salt Lake County the taxes on said Lots 19 and 20,
Block 9, Irving Park Addition, Salt Lake City Survey,
pursuant to assessment made therefor by the Utah State
Tax Commission. (Tr. 39)
ARGUMENT
POINT I and POINT II
POINT I. THAT THE EVIDENCE AND THE FINDINGS DO NOT SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT THE
RESPONDENTS HA VE ESTABLISHED ANY TITLE TO OR
OWNERSHIP IN SAID REAL PROPERTY.
POINT II. THAT UNTIL THE RESPONDENTS HAVE
ESTABLISHED SUCH TITLE AND OWNERSHIP, IT IS
ERROR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE
BARRED UNDER SECTION 78-12-5.2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, OR UNDER ANY OTHER SECTION, FROM
ASSERTING THEIR OWNERSHIP.

For the purposes of argument, Appellants have
combined Points I and II in order to avoid being repetitious and in order to clearly present the problem at issue.
We believe the problem can be simply stated to be "Can
4

the hold(·r of a tax title claim an absolute ownership to
thr real property ba~wd solely upon holding that tax title
for four years after purchase from the County?" We
earnestly contend that he cannot and that he must establish the other elements of adverse possession and particularly that of actual possession.

As this Court well knows, the various statutes dealing with limitations of actions and with adverse possession have been the subject of a number of legislative
t•nactnwnts and of a considerable number of decisions
h~· the Court in recent years. The problem now. presented
has not been considered in its entirety in any prior deci~ion. '\Ve have reviewed all of the cases bearing on the
rnhjPct since the adoption of the 1951 amendments and
have carefully considered those amendments. These
amendments, together with the other pertinent sections
of the Code, are now numbered as Sections 5, 5.1, 5.2,
:i.3, 6, 7, 7.1, 8, 9, 12, and 12.1 of Chapter 12 of Title 78
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
It is our contention that these sections must be read

together, that they define the elements of adverse pos~ession and that the holding of a tax title for four years
after purchase from the County is only one of those elements.
It does not appear to us to be possible that a legislative enactment could constitutionally force a property
nwner to actually occupy, fence or cultivate property to
which he has legal title should such owner be disinclined
to do so; nor may such legislation deprive an owner of

title to his property solely by reason of such disinclination. Statutes of limitation and of adverse possession
require affirmative action on the part of the disseisoi ,
and not on the part of the true owner, in such manner
and form that such owner is put on notice of the adverse
claim.
The matter is well discussed and excellently presented in the following excerpts from 3 Am J ur 2d
commencing on page 86 of the treatise on Adverse Possess10n:
"The basic requisite of adverse possession
is that a cause of action accrue against a disseisor
in order that the statute of limitations may be·
gin to run. As developed in succeeding sections,
it is generally held that in order to bar the true
owner of land from recovering it from an occupant in adverse possession and claiming ownership through the operation of the statute of
limitations, the possession must have been for the
whole period prescribed by the statute, actual,
open, visible, notorious, continuous, and hostile
to the true owner's title and to the world at large;
it is also essential that the possession have been
held under a claim of right or title. Under particuar statutes color of title may also be necessary. When these elements coincide and the
possession continues for the statutory period, a
title by adverse possession is acquired." 3 Am
Jur 2d 86
"One claiming title by adverse possession
always claims in derogation of the rigl~t o~ tl:e
real owner· he admits that the legal title is in
another. He rests his claim, not upon a title in
himself, as the true owner, but upon holding ad-
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versely to the true owner for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations. Generally,
adverse possession may exist independently of
title. Thus, as a general rule, one who seeks to
set up an adverse possession need not have a
good title, or in fact any title, except a possession
adverse and hostile to that of the true owner
under a pretense or claim of title. Adverse possession may exist with color of title, however;
under some statutes color of title is essential to
the acquisition of title by adverse possession, and
under others the requirements for obtaining such
a title are less stringent with color of title than
without it." 3 Am Jur 2d 87
"The whole doctrine of title by adverse possession rests upon the acquiescence of the owner
in the hostile acts and claims of the person in
possession. The theory upon which title may be
acquired by adverse possession is that it is to be
implied from the acquiescence of the owner in
the hostile claim for the statutory period. The
ultimate element in the rise of a title through
adverse possession is the acquiescence of the real
owner in the exercise of an obvious, adverse, or
hostile ownership through the statutory period.
The true owner of land who fails to protect his
right against one holding in adverse possession
thereof and manifesting the same as required by
statute and for the length of time fixed thereby,
is considered as having acquiesced in the transfer
of ownership." 3 Am Jur 2d 87
And with respect to the question of possession, the
authors at 3 Am J ur 2d 89 make the following assertions:
"Possession is one of the indispensable elements in adverse possession. Actual possession
or occupancy is always involved in any claim to
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land by adverse possession. There must be aH
actual possessio.n of th~ lands to create a title by
adverse pos~es~10n. It is therefore a general rul·e
that one clamnng land adversely must, in orde,1
that his claim may be effective as against th
owner, be in actual possession thereof, for, with~
out such occupancy, the law assumes the possrssion to be in the owner of the legal title. In th 2
absence of color of title, the rule requires actual
possession of all the land claimed. The statutory
requirements are not satisfied by the assertio~
of the right of possession. Possession will not be
presumed from the execution of a deed. Nor will
the rights of the lawful owner be affected hv his
mere neglect to assert them, unless the prope~ty i~
actually occupied by an adverse claimant."
Since the 1951 amendments to the adverse possession
statute, this Court has been called upon to decide a number of cases brought for the purpose of quieting title to
real estate. Some of these cases were commenced beforr
the effective date of the 1951 amendments and some are
concerned with the amendments, but each case hert>inafter cited involves in some manner the question of adverse possession following the acquisition of a tax title
deed from the County.
In Pender v. Jackson, 260 P. 2d 542, 123 Utah 501,
decided on July 28, 1953, the Court found against the
tax title holder even though taxes had been paid by such
holder from 1940 through 1949. In quoting from Madsen
v. Cohn, 122 Cal App 704, 10 P. 2d 531, the Court said:
1

"Hence, an open and notorious o~cupation
with hostile intent is a necessary constituent of
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an adverse possession. Neither a hostile intent
without such occupation, nor such occupation
without hostile intent, is sufficient."
In Farrer v. Johnson, 271 P. 2d 462, 2 Utah 2d 189,
derided on J un2 10, 1954, the Court found against the
holder of a tax title who, though out of possession, had
paid all of the taxes on the lands in question.

The case of Hansen v. Morris, 283 P. 2d 884, 3 Utah
~d 310, decided on .May 12, 1955, was the first case involving the 1951 amendments. Although the iCourt upheld
the statute, the factual matters upon which the_ adverse
possession was based do not appear in the Court's deci~ion and it is not possible to determine factually the
question of possession.
The second case under the 1951 amendments was
decitlPd on July 16, 1957 and is cited as Peterson v.
Callister, 313 P. 2d 814, 6 Utah 2d 359, affirmed on rehearing on February 3, 1959, in 334 P. 2d 759, 8 Utah
2(1 3-1:8. In this case the County recorded an unacknowledged auditor's tax deed in 1932 and issued an unacknowledged deed to the plaintiffs in 1944. However,
both deeds were recorded; the plaintiffs were in actual
possession and farmed the property continuously from
19±4: to the commencement of the action in 1955; and the
plaintiff paid all of the taxes during these years. A finding for the plaintiff was upheld.
In Michael v. Salt Lake Investment Company, 345
P. 2d 200, 9 Utah 2d 370, decided on October 19, 1959,
the Court found that the defendant had only a 1909 deed
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from the County with no possession or payment of ta_XPS.
The Court found for the plaintiff and made the following observation:
"With ?ef endant's assertion that
must prevail on the strength of their
we have no quarrel, believing, however,
burden in this respect successfully
shouldered."

plaintiffs
own titlP
that their
has been

In Pender v. Alix, 354 P. 2d 1066, 11 Utah 2d 58
'
decided on August 24, 1960, the Court upheld a summary
judgment in a quiet title action. A reading of the decision
would indicate that the Court was satisfi2d with the
proof of possession offered by the successful intervenor.
We have called the Court's attention to the preceeding six cases in order to show that th2 actual occupancy
of the property by the successful litigant conclusively
appears in each, either from the fact recital or from the
Court's assumption in each case.
We would now urge that the case of Lyman v. National Mortgage Bond Corp., 320 P. 2d 322, 7 Utah 2d
123, decided on January 14, 1958, should be conclusive
of the matter in controversy here. In that case the
plaintiffs had secured a tax deed from the County in
1941 and had since been in actual possession, had cultivatBd the property and improved and fenced it. However, they failed to show payment of taxes for four
consecutive years even though the evidence was clear
that those taxes not paid were subsequently redeemed.

10

The Court found, however, that the plaintiffs did not
bring themselves within the statute as to adverse possession and we urge the following ruling from that case to
be eon trolling upon the case at bar:

"In Bowen v. Olson, decided in 1953 under
Section 78-12-12, U.iC.A. 1953, prior to the 1951
amendment, we held that a redemption from a
delinquent tax assessed against this property
claimed by adverse possesion under a tax sale did
not constitute a payment of taxes levied and
assessed upon such property within the meaning
of that statute. After a careful consideration we
adopted the majority rule on that question and
we are not now inclined to overrule that decision
but adhere thereto. The facts in that case are not
distinguishable from the facts in this case.
"Plaintiffs contend that a different result is
required by the 1951 amendments to Section 1042-5, U.C.A. 1943, which is the same as 78-12-5.1,
Pocket Supplement to Volume 9 ,U.C.A. 1953, and
Section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah for 1951, which
is the same as Section 78-12-5.2, Pocket Supplement to Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953. In plaintiff's
brief these sections are referred to as statutes of
limitation as distinguished from the other sections previously cited above, which are referred
to as adverse possession statutes. Hereinafter
these designations will be used to distinguish the
two sets of statutes.
"These sections forbid the commencement or
maintenance of an action or defense claiming
ownership or right of possession to real property,
unless the claimant was seized, possessed or occupied such property within seven years prior to
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the commencement of such action. -Where th
adverse party, in such action, claims under a t :
title
the limitations
period is shortened
to requt.x
•
.
•
1e
seizure, possess10n o.r occupation within four
years after the creat10n of the tax title clailll
rrhese statutes are different from the advers~
possession statutes considered above in that thev
contain no requirement that the adverse party t~
the claimant in such action must have had adverse
possession and paid all taxes assessed against
such property during the limitations period. In
fact, the limitation statutes make no mention of
any rights which the adverse party must have in
order to invoke the provisions of these limitation
statutes.
"A very strict construction of these statutes
might require a holding in plaintiff's favor even
though they have failed to show payment of the
taxes for the period required by the adverse possession statutes, for it is clear that none of the
defendants have actually occupied or been in
possession of the property within the prescribed
limitations period. However, plaintiffs can prevail only if we hold that defendants' claims are
barred under these limitations statutes by their
failure to occupy or be in possession of the
property within the prescribed period, regardless
of whether plaintiffs have proved a valid claim
to this property. Such a holding would leave the
plaintiffs in possession although they have failed
to establish anv valid claim to such property
under the adve;se possession statutes previously
discussed on which their claims are based or by
any other means.
"We do not think that such construction of
these statutes was intended. Plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own claim and not
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alone on the weakness of the defendants' claims
in order to succeed. The mere failure of the
defendants to show that they have actually occupied or been in possession of this property is not
sufficient to bar their rights to recover the
property where, as here, plaintiffs have failed to
establish any valid claim or right to the property
in themselves. These limitation statutes, although
they do not expressly so provide, only bar the
right of a party to maintain an action to recover
real property where the opposing party established a right of possession or mvnership in the
property. This plaintiffs have failed to do, so the
decision must be reversed."
POINT III.
POINT III. THAT THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT
PAID THE TAXES ON SAID REAL PROPERTY WITHIN
THE DEFINITION OF PAYMENT ADOPTED BY THIS
COURT IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES
AS TO SUCH PAYMENT AND THE RESPONDENTS HA VE
NOT BY REASON THEREOF ESTABLISHED ANY TITLE
TO OR OWNERSHIP IN SAID REAL PROPERTY.

'1111e Findings of Fact in this case (Tr. 41) state
that:
"Utah Power & Light Company has paid
taxes to the State Tax Commission within the
requirements of the Public Utilities Act covering
real and personal property owned by said Company in the State of Utah. Said taxes have been
paid each year since the conveyance from Valley
Investment Company to Utah Power & Light
Company. The defendants, A. P. Neilson and
Lillie M. Neilson, have paid to Salt Lake County
when duP the general property taxes assessed by
said County each year since the conveyance from
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Salt . Lake County. This action was comrrie nceu~
Apnl 4, 1963, and the State secured an Order of
Occupancy on the 22nd day of April, 1963."
In order that this apparent discrepancy may beconw
understandable, it is necessary to ref er to the statutes
under which the property of a public utility is assessed
and taxed.
Section 59-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
that" ... All property of public utilities whether operated
within one county or more ... must be assessed by the
State Tax Commission ... "
Section 59-5-52, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, specifies the time of assessment and Section 59-5-55, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, provides for the record of such
assessment. Following compliances with these sections,
the State Tax Commission must apportion public utility
property in proportion to each county and Section 596-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides for such report
from the State Tax Commission to each county auditor.
Thereafter the public utility receives its tax statement
from the county and pays the same to the county treasurer.
Thus, under the Findings in this case the Appellants
have paid the general taxes on this property for each of
the years from 1956 to 1963, both inclusive; and from
these same Findings it can be determined that the Respondents have paid these taxes only for the yearn
1959, 1960, 1961, and 1962.
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\Ye urge that the case of Christensen v. Mitnstcr,
~(ii\ I'. :.?d 75G, 1 Utah 2d 335, decided on February 11,
HJ3J, is controlling here. In that case although the
rHeHdants ·were in actual possession under their tax
deed from the county and had paid taxes for five of the
~ev'n years nPcessary to perfect their title, the payment
of (axes for two years hy the record owner effectively
baned tlw continued assertion of an adverse title. This
Court in holding for the plaintiffs said:
"\Ve prefer to adopt the view espoused by the
authorities cited by plaintiff, and we conclude,
therefore and hold that payment by the record
owner or his agent of the taxes for one or more
!'ears during the 7-year period, prior to any payment thereof having been made by the adverse
possessor, not only extinguishes his tax liability,
hut extinguishes the tax itself and effectively
inkrrupts the continuity of events necessary to
perfect title by adverse possession."
'rhe principles here adopted were upheld and reaffirmed in the succeeding cases of Bowen v. Olson, 268
P. ~d 983, 2 Utah 2d 12, and Lyman v. National Mortgage
Dolld Corp., supra.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the evidence and the
findings made therefrom in this matter wholly fail lo
support any title or ownership in the Respondents as
to the real property involved in this proceeding an<l
that the Appellants as a matter of law are entitled to a
decree to the effect that the legal and beneficial title to
said property remains in them.
Respectfully submitted,
F. GERALD IRVINE and
ROBERT B. PORTER
1407 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants,
Utah Power & Light Company
and Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company of New York
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